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Intellectual property is important because it contributes to science and technology utilization, which in turn 
encourages economic growth. Policymakers should set out the proper scope of intellectual property protection 
so that scientific research progresses, leading to technological innovation.
According to Article 1 of Japan’s Patent Law, intellectual property protection should “encourage inventions 
by promoting their protection and utilization so as to contribute to the development of industry.” In this sense, 
the Patent Law rewards inventors and provides incentive for new inventions by granting exclusive license 
to inventors or their successors for 20 years after patent application to compensate them for their disclosure 
of patented inventions and their contribution to technological progress[1]. If patent protection is excessively 
narrow, researchers will lose their incentive to invent as well as their motivation to seek legal protection as 
compensation for their patent application or information disclosure. On the other hand, patent protection that is 
too extensive will prevent researchers from creating new inventions and commercially feasible products based 
on modifying other researchers’ inventions. Thus, it is necessary to protect intellectual property rights at the 
proper level.
Exploring the proper patent protection level, the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) in the US launched a project to examine the relationship between science and intellectual property 
from a public interest perspective (SIPPI: Science and Intellectual Property in the Public Interest) in 2002. This 
project examines proper intellectual property protection in the science field, guaranteeing equity in access to 
the benefits of science and encouraging debate on intellectual property-related public policy[3]. At its annual 
meeting in February 2004, AAAS held a symposium entitled, “Intellectual Property and the Research Exemption: 
Its Impact on Science” to discuss this topic[4,5].
On the other hand, Japanese policymakers recognize the urgent necessity of clarifying interpretation of 
Article 69, Paragraph 1 of Japan’s Patent Law, which stipulates that “the effects of patent right shall not extend to 
the working of patent right for the purposes of experiment or research.” There are a number of arguments that 
favor this patent exemption. Influential scholars argue that such exemption should apply to “activities that aim at 
technological progress,”[2] but the Japanese courts have not yet clearly expressed a ruling in this regard.
With rapid technological innovation and deeper collaboration among universities,  industries and government, 
it is increasingly necessary to clarify experiments and research activities beyond patent right protection. The 
“Intellectual Property Promotion Plan 2004” (dated May 27, 2004) states that the government will provide a clear 
guideline in FY2004. The Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters has been studying this issue.
Dr. Audrey R. Chapman, co-director of the above-mentioned AAAS project, kindly sent us her paper on the 
“Status of the Research Use Exemption” as a contributed article for the Journal of Science and Technology 
Trends.
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1 Background
Because science is one of the most international 
of all activities, advances in science require the 
freedom of inquiry, the full and open availability 
of scientif ic data on an international basis, 
and the open publication of results.  Growing 
tendencies to seek copyr ight  and patent  
protections for scientific data, research tools, and 
materials, as well as for discoveries, are therefore 
imposing new costs and problems for scientific 
research.
Unti l recently, most developed countr ies 
provided extensive public funding for basic 
sc ient i f ic  research to assure widespread 
availability of and access to the findings.*1  Large 
government investments in basic research and 
development made it possible to argue that 
the conduct of scientific research, including 
the maintenance and distribution of scientific 
data, was a public good.  Traditionally, research 
scientists actively pursued the dissemination of 
research results through the sharing of data and 
publication and were disinclined to patent their 
discoveries.*2
However, the landscape, which encouraged 
the open availability and sharing of scientific 
d i scover ies  ha s  changed i n  major  ways.  
Government policies, beginning in 1980 with 
the adoption of the Bayh - Dole Act in the 
United States, have encouraged the commercial 
development of publ icly funded research. 
Universities, particularly in the United States and 
to a lesser extent elsewhere, now regularly patent 
the results of government-sponsored research and 
consider their research work to be an important 
intellectual property asset.  Increasingly, basic as 
well as applied research is being funded by the 
private sector.  In turn, these developments have 
affected science’s tradition of open publication. 
In many scientific fields, particularly the life 
sciences, scientists are delaying publication 
and withholding data so as to secure their 
intellectual property rights.  A 1997 survey 
indicated, for example, that a substantial portion 
of researchers in the life sciences in the United 
States had delayed publication or withheld results 
and materials from colleagues to protect their 
intellectual property.*3 
Researchers and universities are now seeking 
intellectual property protection for research 
tools and other “upstream” research discoveries, 
especially in the area of genomic research, which 
would have been considered too far removed 
from the commercial marketplace to qualify 
for patent protection a generation ago.  As 
universities have become increasingly aggressive 
patent owners, this has imposed restrictions 
on the transfer of research tools, materials, and 
reagents.   
Within many sectors of science, the ownership 
of intel lectual property r ights is becoming 
fragmented across institutions in both the 
public and private sectors and, in the view of 
many, is becoming an “anticommons.” *4  This 
fragmentation or “patent thicket” often requires 
that researchers spend a significant amount of 
time locating a multitude of patent rights to 
pursue a project.  This results in increased legal 
costs and financial burdens as scientists bundle 
licenses together licenses in order to conduct 
research or develop new products. Efforts to 
develop vitamin A enriched “golden rice,” by an 
international team of researchers for example, 
required more than 40 separate l icensing 
agreements.*5 
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2 Existing Research
 Use Exemption Provisions
The general rule is that there is an infringement 
of a patent when an unauthorized use of the 
claimed invention takes place in the jurisdiction 
covered by the patent during the period of its 
life. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, 
one of which is an experimental use exemption. 
Several countries have statutes that in some 
circumstances provide exemptions for research 
carr ied out in pr ivate for non - commercial 
purposes and acts done for exper imenta l 
purposes.  Many European Union countries as 
well as Japan recognize a limited experimental 
use exemption, but the scope of the exemption is 
often quite narrow and in some instances unclear. 
In some jurisdictions, including the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, limited 
experimental use defenses are recognized in case 
law, although there remains a dispute over the 
scope.  
There is significant variation in the scope and 
nature of the experimental use exemption.  One 
key consideration is the difference between a 
right of experimentation on a patented invention 
and experimentation using a patented invention 
for broader research purposes.  The patent 
laws of the United Kingdom and many other 
countries in the European Union explicitly limit 
the research exemption to the subject matter of 
the patented invention for purposes of research 
that “builds upon the knowledge provided by the 
patent, and aims to discover something unknown 
about the subject matter of the patent or to test a 
hypothesis about it.”*6  Similarly, Japanese patent 
law states that “the effects of the patent right 
shall not extend to the working of the patent 
right for the purposes of the experiment or 
research.”*7 This definition generally excludes 
the permissible application of the invention 
for broader researcher purposes, such as the 
development of new products. Another important 
distinction in national laws concerns the extent 
to which the appl icabi l ity of the research 
exemption depends on whether there is some 
commercial motivation involved.  
T he  U. S .  P a t e nt  Ac t  h a s  no  s t a t u to r y  
exemptions for noncommercial or research uses 
of an invention with the exception of legislative 
provision for cl inical testing related to the 
development and submission of information for 
regulatory approval of generic pharmaceutical 
products.*8  Nonetheless, many U.S. scientists 
had assumed that it was permissible for them 
to use patented information and resources 
without seeking explicit permission to do so 
if they did not intend to commercialize the 
products. A 2002 decision by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, rejected 
an “experimental use defense” in a patent 
infringement lawsuit against Duke University. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that neither U.S. 
law nor judicial precedent provided for such a 
research exemption. The Court also held that 
the non -profit or educational status of Duke 
University did not determine the availability of 
the experimental use defense because research 
projects with arguably no commercial application 
unmistakably further the institution’s legitimate 
business objectives.*9  In June 2003, the Supreme 
Court denied a petition for review of the case*10.
The decision in this case is likely to have 
major implications for the research community 
in the United States. Faced with this situation, 
many researchers and f irms may choose to 
invest resources in less promising projects 
with fewer licensing obstacles and lower initial 
start-up costs.  In addition, some researchers and 
developers, especially in universities, may be 
ill equipped to handle the multiple transactions 
necessary for acquiring the rights to research 
tools.  It may also encourage academic research 
to be diverted to foreign institutions in countries 
with broader experimental use exceptions or the 
absence of patent coverage.  
3 Reform Options
Given the situation noted above, instead of 
spurring investment and product development, 
more intellectual property rights may lead to 
fewer useful products for improving human 
welfare.  At the least there is a need to clarify 
the scope of the experimental use exception in 
many jurisdictions so as to eliminate uncertainty. 
There would a lso be many advantages in 
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establishing more uniform provisions across 
countries consistent with the requirements of the 
TRIPS Agreement.  It is the view of this author 
that the provisions of a statutory research use 
exemption should also be broadened to cover 
research using a patented invention.  Options 
for reform of experimental use defenses are 
under consideration in several jurisdictions.  The 
American Association for the Advancement of 
Science has recently initiated a project to evaluate 
these proposals so as to ascertain which would 
be the most conducive to encouraging scientific 
research and innovation.
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Explanation
• (The tragedy of) The anticommons
   “The t r agedy of  the ant icommons” 
means that excessive pr ivate property 
right protection of research outcomes will 
fragment intellectual property rights and 
prevent their effective utilization because 
there will no right holders who are able to 
utilize them effectively[6,7].
• Bayh-Dole Act
   The “Bayh - Dole Act” is off icial ly the 
“Patent and Trademark Act Amendments 
of 1980” proposed by US senators Birch 
Bayh and Robert Dole. This legislation 
al lows university, NPO and smal l - and 
medium-sized enterprises to entitle their 
federal - government - funded inventions. 
In addition, if they obtain a patent and 
license their invention to a third party, 
they are required to spend their royalty 
income on scientif ic R&D activities for 
inventors. Because of the Bayh-Dole Act, 
many universit ies star ted to establ ish 
Technology Licensing Organizations (TLO) 
inside or outside universities. This legislation 
has also paved the way for universities 
to obtain patents for government- funded 
research outcomes and also to transfer their 
technologies based on license agreements 
with private corporations[8].
•  International comparison of legal frameworks 
in terms of “research activities exempted from 
patent right protection”
   Patent  r ig ht s  u sua l ly  have  cer t a i n  
limitations and are not applicable to research 
activities from the viewpoint of the patent’s 
characteristics and of public interest[1]. 
Major nations have the following legal patent 
limitations.
 i) The United States
   In the United States, “experimental use 
exemption” originates not from statute 
law but from case law. “Experimental use 
exemption” is not applicable if the use of 
the patented invention is “in furtherance of 
the alleged infringer’s legitimate business” 
and is not “solely for amusement, to satisfy 
idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry.”[9]
ii) The United Kingdom
   Section 60(5) of the UK Patents Act states 
that “An act which...would constitute an 
infringement of a patent for an invention 
shall not do so if (a) it is done privately and 
for purposes which are not commercial; 
or (b) it is done for experimental purposes 
relat ing to the subject - mat ter  of  the 
invention...” 
iii) Germany
   Article 11 of German Patents Act stipulates 
that “The effects of a patent right shall not 
extend to (a) acts done privately and for 
non-commercial purposes; or (b) acts done 
for experimental purposes relating to the 
subject-matter of the patented invention...”
iv) France
   Ar ticle 613, Paragraph 5 of France’s 
Intel lectual Property Act sets out that 
“The effects of a patent right shall not 
extend to (a) acts done privately and for 
non-commercial purposes; or (b) acts done 
for experimental purposes relating to the 
subject-matter of the patented invention...”
v) Japan
   Patent r ights are only appl icable for 
using patentable inventions for “business 
purposes.” This concept refers to the use of 
patentable inventions that do not fall under 
the “use of patentable inventions that is 
unrelated to industry, in other words, for 
personal use or family use.”
   Article 69, Paragraph 1 of Japan’s Patent 
Law states that “the effects of the patent 
right shall not extend to the working of the 
patent right for the purposes of experiment 
or research.” While the Japanese courts have 
not yet clearly expressed an interpretation 
in this regard, influential scholars argue that 
experimental use exemption should apply 
only to “activities that aim for technical 
progress,” such as patentability investigation, 
t h e  i nve s t i g a t i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n s  a n d  
experiments for improvement/development 
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purposes[9].
• Madey v. Duke University
   In this court trial, the US Supreme Court 
expressed its judgment on “experimental 
use exemption.” The plainti f f f i led for 
an injunction on the grounds that Duke 
University’s experiments and research 
activities would infringe another person’s 
rights.
   Professor Madey at Duke University 
installed some equipment in his laboratory. 
Several pieces of equipment in Madey’s 
laboratory were covered by patents owned 
by Madey. Duke continued to use the 
laboratory’s equipment even a f ter h is 
resignation. Based on this unauthorized use 
of his patents, Madey sued Duke for patent 
infringement. However, Duke argued that 
the university is a non-profit organization 
that  prov ides  educat ion and that  i t s  
continued use of the equipment falls under 
“experimental use exemption.”
   The district court judged that Duke’s use of 
the equipment fell under “experimental use 
exemption,” but at appeal court level, the 
Federal Circuit Court denied Duke’s logic. 
In short, making clear its intent to limit the 
“experimental use exemption” strictly to 
activities that are “solely for amusement, 
to satisfy idle curiosity, or for str ictly 
philosophical inquiry,” the court noted that, 
regardless of whether a particular institution 
or ent it y is engaged in endeavors for 
commercial gain, as long as the act furthers 
“the alleged infringer’s legitimate business,” 
the act does not qualify as the very narrow 
and str ictly l imited “experimental use 
exemption.” (See Madey v. Duke University, 
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed.Cir2002).)
   In response to this ruling, Duke University 
filed a final appeal to the US Supreme Court, 
but the Supreme Court refused to grant a 
review in June 2003. (See Duke University 
v. Madey No. 02-1007 (Supreme Court of the 
United States 2003).)[9]
•   T he  TRIPS  Agreement  (Agreement  on  
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights)
   The TRIPS Agreement, which became 
effective on January 1, 1995, sets out the 
minimum requirements for WTO member 
nations in terms of patents and other 
intellectual property protection.
   I n  t e r m s  o f  ex p e r i me nt / r e s e a r ch  
exemptions, Article 30 stipulates that there 
are “Exceptions to R ights Conferred,” 
stating, “members may provide l imited 
exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent, provided that such exceptions 
do not unreasonably conflict with normal 
exploitat ion of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legit imate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interests of third parties.”
(Original Japanese version: published in August 2004)
